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This article argues that comparative law needs to explore its critical potential when engaging 
with the European harmonization process and its effects on the law of the Member States, in 
particular within politically contentious areas of law that are heavily influenced by moral 
views and national values, such as equality or labor law. To develop a deeper understanding 
of the European harmonization process within these areas of law, comparative law needs to 
be able to explain existing differences in the national judicial reception of EU harmonized 
law that occur despite its common European origin and despite the exclusive competence of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter, CJEU) to interpret EU law.1 Thus, 
there needs to be room to identify and explore national legal and non-legal factors that affect 
the national courts’ application of EU law. 
The Europeanization and harmonization of the law of the Member States have invigorated 
comparative law research, as these processes encourage legal academics, judges and 
practitioners to abandon inward-looking doctrinal approaches.2 The ‘multi-layered’ or ‘multi-
polar’3 European legal order influences and is influenced by the laws and legal systems of the 
Member States.4 This has encouraged European and comparative scholars to focus on the 
dialogue between the national courts and the CJEU,5 on European legal transplants,6 on the 
                                                 
1 Article 267 TFEU. 
2 MARTIJN W HESSELINK, The New European Legal Culture, in THE NEW EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 11, 51-55 
(2002); Mathias Reinmann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth 
Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 691 (2002); Jen Hendry, Review Essay: Contemporary Comparative Law, 
9(12) GERMAN L. J. 2253 (2008); Jaakko Husa, The Tip of the Iceberg or what lies beneath the surface of 
comparative law, 12(1) MAASTRICHT J. 73, 82 (2005). 
3 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Methodology and European law, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE 
LAW 100-105, 113 (Mark van Hoecke ed., 2004). 
4 Dagmar Schiek et al., A Comparative Perspective on Non-Discrimination law, in CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 
ON NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW 1 (Dagmar Schiek et al. eds., 
2007). 
5 LABOUR LAW IN THE COURTS: NATIONAL JUDGES AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (Silvana Sciarra ed., 
2001); KAREN J ALTER, THE EUROPEAN COURT’S POLITICAL POWER (2009); KAREN J ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE 
SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW (2001); Arthur Dyevre, Unifying the field of comparative judicial politics, 2(2) 
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6 Alan Watson, Legal Transplant and European Private law, 4(4) ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. available at 
www.ejcl.org/44/art44-2.html (2000); Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of "Legal Transplants", 4 MAASTRICHT 
J. 111-24 (1997); TT Arvind, The "transplant effect" in harmonization, 59(1) INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 65 (2010); Jan 
M Smits, Convergence of Private Law in Europe: Towards a New Ius Commune?, in COMPARATIVE LAW 219 
(Esin Örücü and David Nelken eds., 2007). Regarding the use of comparative law within European law making, 
see: Rob van Gestel and Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Comparative Law and EU Legislation: Inspiration, Evaluation 
or Justification?, in THE METHOD AND CULTURE OF COMPARATIVE LAW 301 (Maurice Adams and Dirk Heirbaut 
eds., 2014); Ladeur supra note 3. 
  
effects of Europeanization on national legal systems7 and on how more-effective 
harmonization (and cooperation) can be achieved.8 
In many ways, the study of European law requires a comparative approach. The CJEU relies 
on the comparative law method for interpretation and judicial law-making. The CJEU may 
refer to the legal principles common to the legal traditions of the Member States in areas 
where the Treaties are silent or to consider what interpretation is the most appropriate by 
reference to the legal orders of the Member States.9 National courts may also want to engage 
with comparativism to ensure the law embodies universal or European principles rather than 
domestic ones.10 Moreover, it has been emphasized that comparative law becomes relevant 
for national courts determining the meaning of EU law and the need to refer questions for a 
preliminary ruling to the CJEU under CILFIT’s11 acte clair doctrine.12 Comparative law is 
also relevant for the study of EU law itself. Rather that the CJEU, it is primarily national 
courts that apply and give effect to EU law. The study of their diverging approaches towards 
applying EU law is thus very much relevant for the study of EU law.  
There is also little doubt that traditional approaches to comparative law have contributed to 
European legal integration.13 Primary and secondary EU law have long influenced the law of 
the Member States and challenged both national legislators and courts to implement and give 
effect to new, often foreign, legal concepts, either because EU law is directly applicable 
within the Member States or because the national legislators had to implement EU directives 
and thus create new national legislation with a European origin (see below). This process 
                                                 
7 Jan M Smits, The Europeanization of National Legal Systems, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 229 (Mark van Hoecke ed., 2004); THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE AUTONOMY 
OF THE MEMBER STATES (Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz and Bruno de Witte eds., 2012); Mads Andenas and Duncan 
Fairgrieve, Intent on making mischief: seven ways of using comparative law, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
25-60 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri ed., 2012); Reinhard Zimmermann, Comparative Law and the Europeanization 
of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 539-78 (Mathias Reimann and Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2008); PAULA GILIKER, THE EUROPEANISATION OF ENGLISH TORT LAW (2014). 
8 Hugh Collins, Why Europe Needs a Civil Code 21(4) EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 907-22 (2013); CESL, Legal 
Nationalism or a Plea for Appropriate Governance? (Special Issue, Stefan Grundmann ed.)’ 8(3) EUR. REV. 
CONT. L. 241 (2012). 
9 Koen Lenaerts and Kathleen Gutman, The Comparative Law Method and the Court of Justice of the EU, in 
COURTS AND COMPARATIVE LAW 139-176 (M Andenas and D Fairgrieve eds., 2015); Koen Lenaerts and José A. 
Gutiérrez-Fons, To Say what the Law of the EU is: Methods of interpretation and the European Court of Justice, 
20(2) COLUM. J. EUR. L. 3-61 (2014); Koen Lenaerts, Interlocking Legal orders in the European Union and 
Comparative Law, 52(4) INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 873-906 (2003). 
10 Esin Örücü, Comparative Law in Practice: The Courts and the Legislator, in COMPARATIVE LAW 432 (Esin 
Örücü and David Nelken eds., 2007). 
11 Case 283/81, CILFIT v Ministero della Sanità EU:C:1982:335, 1982 E.C.R. 3415. 
12 Koen Lenaerts, The Unity of European Law and the Overload of the ECJ, in THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 211-239 (Ingolf Pernice et al. eds., 2006). 
13 For a detailed discussion of the use of comparative law and the modern functional method, see: Esin Örücü, 
Developing Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW 43-65 (Esin Örücü and David Nelken eds., 2007); Roger 
Cotterrell, Is it so Bad to be Different? Comparative Law and the Appreciation of Diversity, in COMPARATIVE 
LAW 133-154 (Esin Örücü and David Nelken eds., 2007). 
  
presumably harmonizes the law of the Member States and ensures that, for example, 
employees or consumers have the same rights, or at least a certain common level of 
protection, everywhere in the European Union. This harmonization process, together with the 
closer economic integration of the Member States, then encourages further convergence of 
the legal systems—which can be supported by comparative projects exploring the ‘common 
core’ of the laws of the Member States.14 
However, the converging effects of EU harmonization have long been called into question,15 
and the legal transplants introduced via secondary EU legislation often face significant 
obstacles once they reach the national legal arena. Comparatists who are more aware of 
cultural and socio-economic diversity suggest that for it to be successful, the EU legal 
harmonization project needs to be tolerant of differences and to resist unification.16 This is 
not contrary to the European idea. Respect for differences and minorities is a key parameter 
to assess the eligibility of candidate States to join the Union,17 and the European motto 
‘united in diversity’18 emphasizes respect for linguistic, cultural, historic, and political 
differences that can enrich interaction within the Union. Ultimately, complex legal systems 
always have to reconcile and sustain contradictory principles and rules within one legal 
tradition.19 However, such respect for diversity sits uncomfortably with harmonization 
processes which are not sensible to the legal cultural differences and are experienced as 
overly intense. The respect for national differences seems particularly important in areas 
where EU law reaches deeply into private relationships, personal identity, the family, and the 
political and economic sphere, such as equality or labor law. This article focuses on this area 
of law, in particular equality law. However, cultural sensitivities also seem to extend beyond 
these spheres and into legal areas more detached from the individual and with closer links to 
the market, such as commercial law or public procurement, in which there have been recent 
calls to maximize regulatory freedom on a national level.20 The insights developed in this 
article may thus be relevant beyond the narrow scope of the case it carries out on the basis of 
EU equality law.  
The critical potential of comparative law can support a harmonization process that is more 
aware of cultural differences, allows for more flexibility and avoids ‘alienating’ large parts of 
                                                 
14 KONRAD ZWEIGERT AND HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 27 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford 
University Press 3rd ed. 1998). Further discussion Esin Örücü supra note 13, at 51; Günter Frankenberg, How to 
do projects with comparative law, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 120-43 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri ed., 2012). 
15 Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converting, 45(1) INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 52-81 (1996). 
16 David Nelken, Comparative Law and Legal Studies, in COMPARATIVE LAW 31 (Esin Örücü and David Nelken 
eds., 2007). 
17 Ibid. 
18 The motto was codified in Article I-8 of the failed Constitutional Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty does not refer to 
any symbols of the European Union. 
19 H PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 361-372 (5th edn, 2014). 
20 Sue Arrowsmith, The Purpose of the EU Procurement Directives, 14 CAM. Y.B. EURO. LEGAL. STUD. 1-47 
(2012). 
  
the European populace,21 who often experience EU harmonization as a top-down process that 
forces them to give up legal concepts and social and commercial conventions that are deeply 
engrained in their national socio-legal identity and culture. Critical comparative studies can 
help engage with these national cultural or political differences that limit the success of 
harmonization via directives and other legal transplants and may support an alternative 
harmonization agenda that is more aware of legal, cultural and political differences. While 
there is a growing number of scholars who propose and engage with critical approaches to 
comparative law,22 few have considered the value of critical comparative law in the context 
of EU harmonization. This is not too surprising, given that critical comparison precisely 
challenges the focus on Western Systems, Western-biased analysis and legocentrism23 and 
often rejects European harmonization projects.24 However, there is value in considering 
critical comparative law within the context of real-world phenomena, if only to avoid critical 
approaches becoming conservative in the sense that they reject or ignore any form of possible 
change.25 After all, whether one supports or rejects European harmonization and the 
convergence of European legal systems, EU directives do indeed exist, are implemented on a 
national level, and are subsequently applied and interpreted by national courts. How national 
legal and non-legal factors influence these processes is thus of practical and theoretical 
interest.  
Ultimately, methodological approaches engaging with the EU harmonization process need to 
incorporate the national cultural influences on the implemented law, which are not always 
obvious at the point of implementation. This article therefore suggests a focus on the judicial 
reception of EU harmonized law and national-European legal hybrids because national courts 
are part of an inter-community group of courts and are embedded in their own cultural 
context.26 The relevance of those national factors as well as European influences should thus 
become particularly obvious once one focuses on the national courts’ application of EU 
harmonized law. Secondly, the comparison has to go beyond the legal and consider the wider 
cultural and political context of the national Member States. This can be done by, for 
example, considering the engagement of various stakeholders with the subject matter and the 
protective standard the harmonized law tries to achieve. These overlapping narratives can 
then provide indications of the national identity, self-understanding and legal consciousness 
surrounding the application of harmonized law at the national level. Finally, the comparative 
                                                 
21 Dagmar Schiek, Comparative Law and European Harmonisation, 21(2) EUR. BUS. L. REV. 223 (2010). 
22 See for example, GÜNTER FRANKENBERG, COMPARATIVE LAW AS CRITIQUE (2016). 
23 Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparison: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26(2) HARV. INT’L L.J. 411-456 
(1985). Legocentrism puts the law at the center of the analysis, perhaps to the detriment of other cultural factors 
that are possibly more influential and that determine the de facto outcome of a dispute. It views law as an 
autonomous, separate and self-contained system. See also Jaakko Husa, About the Methodology of Comparative 
Law – Some Comments Concerning the Wonderland…, (MAASTRICHT FACULTY OF LAW, Working Paper No. 5, 
2007); Husa, supra note 2, at 73-94. 
24 Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60(1) MOD. L. REV. 44-63 (1997). 
25 Ugo Mattei and Anna Di Robilant, The Art and Science of Critical Scholarship, 10(1) EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 29-
59 (2002).  
26 SILVANA SCIARRA, Integration through Courts, in LABOUR LAW IN THE COURTS 1 (2001). 
  
analysis needs to be able to recognize feedback effects produced by the national courts’ 
dialogue with the CJEU. For example, the concept of indirect discrimination can be traced 
back to early international law and was pioneered in the US case Griggs v Duke Power.27 It 
then reached the EU via the UK and has been modified and developed ever since.28 This is 
obvious once one follows the legislative development of the equality law directives and 
national laws implementing the directives and once one looks at the case law development 
and meaning and use of the concept of indirect discrimination within the larger society. Legal 
concepts and the judicial reception of harmonized law develop over time and can be 
influenced by other national courts, CJEU judgments, and the broader political and social 
context. Essentially, adequate consideration of these effects on the application of harmonized 
law requires a reflective analysis29 that views law within culture and thus allows for a diverse, 
potentially contradictory, and functioning of law within different and broader cultural 
contexts. This article aims to consider how some of the insights of critical comparison can 
contribute to a culturally-informed comparative law method that uncovers the legal and non-
legal factors affecting the application of EU harmonized law and national-European hybrids 
on a national level. In particular, its turn to culture and political underpinning and power 
relations can be helpful even if critical comparison has been more successful in 
systematically identifying the methodological weaknesses of traditional comparative law 
approaches than in providing practical solutions to overcome these challenges.30 The article 
will demonstrate how the insights of critical comparison can enrich the comparison by 
discussing an original culturally-informed method that creates a framework for feasible 
comparison and allows space for multi-layered cultural and political narratives to shed light 
on the harmonization process.  
With all this in mind, and to explore the potential of critical comparison in this context, this 
article first evaluates existing comparative law methods and their suitability to identify 
national legal and cultural factors that influence the judicial reception of EU harmonized law 
on a national level. It thus assesses how traditional comparative law methods fall short of 
providing sound methodological approaches to the complexity challenge posed by 
harmonized law and how critical comparison can help us understand the EU legal 
harmonization process. The article then considers the alternative approaches advanced within 
the field of critical comparative law and their potential to develop a deeper understanding of 
the national courts’ reception of EU harmonized law, which forms a key part of the broader 
legal harmonization process. In the second part, the article develops an original multi-layered 
                                                 
27 401 US 424, 91 S Ct 846 (1971) 
28 SANDRA FREDMAN, DISCRIMINATION LAW 177 (2nd ed. 2011); Dagmar Schiek, Indirect Discrimination, in 
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW 
323-475 (Dagmar Schiek et al. eds., 2007). 
29 Or reflexivity; David Nelken, Defining and Using the Concept of Legal Culture, in COMPARATIVE LAW 127 
(Esin Örücü and David Nelken eds., 2007). 
30 Vernon Valentine Palmer, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology 53(1) 
AM. J. COMP. L. 261, 265 (2005); Anne Peters and Heiner Schwenke, ‘Comparative law beyond Post-Modernism’ 
49(4) INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 800-834 (2000); Sjef van Erp, European Private Law, 3.1 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. 
available at www.ejcl.org/31/abs31-1.html (1999). 
  
culturally-informed comparative law method. The proposal goes beyond the existing methods 
of comparative law by including critical aspects and stressing the relevance of embedding a 
general normative framework in any comparative critique. It challenges comparatists to reach 
deeply into national cultural spheres and to identify key influences on the application of EU 
rules and EU-national legal ‘hybrids’.31 The method creates room for multi-layered narratives 
of comparison aimed at gaining a deeper understanding of national legal and non-legal 
cultural backgrounds that can hinder or facilitate harmonization processes. This enriched 
comparative critique can offer new insights into the process of legal harmonization in the EU, 
particularly by focusing on the point of application rather than on the previous phases of 
creation of EU law and its reception by Member States. This original method has an 
explanatory and evaluative component. From the explanatory perspective, it identifies 
national influences that are either conducive or create obstacles for successful harmonization 
processes, and it explains why certain directives are implemented more successfully in some 
Member States than others. Additionally, from the evaluative perspective, the method 
contributes to a critical evaluation of the achievements of specific harmonization processes 
and, more generally, of whether harmonization processes can contribute to the general aims 
of the EU, such as peace and well-being (Article 3 Treaty of the European Union, TEU).32  
The article is divided in three main sections. After specifying what is encapsulated in the 
concept of EU harmonized law and national-European legal hybrids, the article will explore 
how the specific nature of harmonized law and the Member States’ duty to implement 
directives33 challenge some of the ‘epistemic foundations’34 of the law supported by the 
functional or common law approach. It will then discuss the challenges that arise in the cross-
country comparison of the judicial reception of EU harmonized law and will evaluate the 
adequacy of other methods of comparative law and their critique from the perspective of the 
comparison of harmonized law. Both sections thus form the first part of the article and 
engage with the methodological requirements within the context of EU harmonized law, 
uncover the weaknesses of traditional comparative law methods and consider the potential of 
critical comparison. The second part of the article will then discuss possible solutions to the 
methodological conundrum posed by critical comparison and harmonized law by developing 
a new method that is culturally-informed and leaves room for multi-layered narratives. 
Throughout the discussion of the proposed method, the article will draw on examples from 
the area of EU non-discrimination law, which is selected for the case study. This has a 
practical as well as a conceptual justification. Firstly, and from a reflective perspective, the 
use of the proposed method to compare harmonized law is based on a comparative project the 
author has recently been involved in. It thus draws upon experiences with the application of 
the method in the area of EU and employment non-discrimination law and allows for an 
                                                 
31 Martijn W Hesselink, A European Legal Method?, 40 15(1) EUR. L. J. (2009). 
32 If only on the meta-sphere, see Schiek supra note 21, at 208. 
33 Article 288 TFEU. 
34 Jaakko Husa, Farewell to Functionalism or Methodological Tolerance?, 67(3) RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] [THE RABEL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW] 430 (2003) 
  
extended illustration of the way the method is to be applied in each of its three steps. More 
importantly, and from a conceptual perspective, this area of EU law is particularly useful for 
the consideration of the possible contribution of critical comparison, because labor and 
equality laws are often deeply connected with national politics, social roles, labor relations 
and the wider legal and non-legal culture. The national factors influencing these areas of law 
will thus presumably be significant. The article will conclude by bringing the main arguments 
developed in both main parts together and identifying how a changed mind-set advocated by 
critical comparatists can help us develop a deeper understanding of the harmonization process 
and how this may be possible in practice (V). 
The comparison of EU harmonized law 
Multi-level governance theory has long been used to identify how the EU legal order requires 
entangled and ‘functionally interdependent’35 authorities on different national and 
supranational territorial and jurisdictional levels to negotiate and coordinate their 
interrelations because of shared competences and dynamic arrangements.36 Sovereign states 
may give up power to sub-national authorities, civil-society organizations and supranational 
or intergovernmental organizations, which then affects inter alia policy making.37 However, 
the purpose of this section is not to repeat or engage with the multi-level governance 
processes that influence decision and policy making on the European and national level. 
Rather, it aims to clarify what is meant by EU harmonized law throughout this article and 
why conventional comparative law analysis, such as functionalism, is of limited suitability to 
uncover the interaction of the EU harmonized law and the broader national context.  
Within the national context, primary and secondary EU law may be relevant because both can 
affect the national legal order and can be applied by national courts. However, their 
integration in the national legal system differs. Primary treaty norms with a direct effect can 
be directly invoked by individuals in national court,38 and regulations are generally 
applicable.39 Thus, there is no need to integrate these rules into national law, which means 
they can be viewed separately from the national legal order—they are European laws directly 
applicable within the national context. However, directives have to be implemented into 
national law.40 These implemented laws are national laws, since the national legislator and 
national legislative processes have significant influence on their form, shape and scope. Of 
                                                 
35 Simona Piattoni, Multi-level Governance: Historic and Conceptual Analysis, 31(2) J. EUR. INTEGRATION 163, 
172 (2009). 
36 See general Fabian Amtenbrink, The Multidimensional Constitutional Legal Order of the European Union, 29 
NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 3-68 (2008). 
37 Ibid, 172-176; Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Unravelling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level 
Governance, 97(2) AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 233-243 (2003). 
38 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen EU:C:1963:1, 1963 E.C.R. 3. 
39 Article 288(2) TFEU. 
40 Article 288(3) TFEU. 
  
course, the level of national discretion depends on the directive’s wording and whether it is a 
minimum or maximum harmonization directive. Either way, they become part of the national 
legal system and are very often part of wider statutes or codes that go beyond the directives’ 
requirement and/or address a wider scope of issues. However, the implementation process 
does not free them from their European tail. After all, the original directive and the CJEU 
interpretation of it can influence the interpretation and application of the national law. 
National laws with a European origin are thus both national and European laws.  
The word ‘hybrid’ illustrates this.41 The terminology used in the directive and implemented 
into national law, whether familiar to the national legal order or not, is then subject to the 
national as well as European influences. Hesselink demonstrates this by reference to the 
Unfair Terms Directive,42 which foresees a good faith/fairness provision in Article 3. Once 
implemented, it is questionable whether the term can or should be interpreted depending on 
the national context or independently as an autonomous European legal concept. On the one 
hand, whether certain clauses are unfair and contrary to good faith may depend on the 
national context.43 On the other hand, there are clear minimum standards set by the directive 
as interpreted by the CJEU and, in the case of maximum harmonization directives, a 
maximum standard.44 This exposes the ‘hybrid and dynamic multi-level’45 character of the 
European legal system, which interacts and harmonizes certain aspects of national law 
without taking over these areas completely. Throughout this article, any reference to EU 
harmonized law primarily refers to these laws that implement directives and are thus 
embedded in the national context but are also directly connected to the European legal order. 
This is not to say that directly applicable treaty norms may not also be influenced by the 
national context when applied by national courts but that their application could, in principle, 
be more separate from the rest of the national legal system even if the principle of 
equivalence and effectiveness46 provides for certain inroads into the national system. 
The focus on European harmonized law as hybrid also demonstrates why traditional 
approaches towards comparative law are ill-suited to appropriately recognize the 
interconnection of EU and national law within the multi-layered system. Functionalism, for 
example, suggests focusing the comparison on functional equivalents.47 This means that the 
comparatist should take social conflicts as a starting point, as the common comparative 
denominator (tertium comparationis),48 and then compare the different national laws that are 
                                                 
41 Hesselink supra note 31, at 40. 
42 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L95/29) as 
amended by Directive 2011/83/EU of The European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 (OJ 2011 
L304/64). 
43 Case C-237/02, Freiburger Kommunalbauten EU:C:2004:209, 2004 E.C.R. I-3403. 
44 Hesselink supra note 31, at 41-42. 
45 Ibid, 42; Christian Joerges, The Impact of European Integration on Private Law, 3 EUR. L. J. 378-406 (1997). 
46 PAUL CRAIG AND GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW 239-251 (6th ed, 2015). 
47 Zweigert and Kötz supra note 14. 
48 Örücü supra note 97; Antonios Emmanuel Platsas, The Functional and the Dysfunctional in the Comparative 
Method of Law 12(3) ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. available at http://www.ejcl.org/123/art123-3.pdf (2008). 
  
seen as alternative responses to the same problem.49 Law is thus seen as reflecting society’s 
needs, although research on legal transplants has demonstrated that laws are often adopted 
not because of need or suitability, but rather prestige and authority.50 This is even more 
significant within the European context, where Member States are obliged to implement 
directives, and even if the process of transplantation and possible diffusion of the legal 
concept is controlled by the adopting system,51 which means that the national context 
continues to be important. Functionalism’s greatest asset is that it provides a seductively 
simple solution to the difficult question of how to choose the objects of comparison: one 
should compare the laws or extra-legal rules that address the same social conflict. However, 
the use of social problems as objective parameters outside the comparison requires a priori 
assumptions to create an epistemic foundation of law,52 which is problematic within the 
European context, where national legal systems have limited freedom regarding their legal 
agenda. Functionalism struggles to identify national influences on the application of 
harmonized law and the political agenda behind the harmonization process because it focuses 
on legal solutions to social problems. This has been considered to be reductionist and 
legocentric, as it isolates the law from its ‘socio-economic and politico-cultural 
environment’.53 It ignores the political background of a legal and historical development, 
which turned conflicts into legal questions.54 This is not to say, that directives cannot have 
those functions or aim at solving certain social conflicts from a European perspective. Rather, 
that these functions are not necessarily the only or predominant reason why the directives are 
implemented in the national legal systems. Member States also face obligations of specific 
transposition even if their national courts' practices already achieve the aim of the directive.55  
For example, if we view EU equal-pay provisions from a functional perspective, we would 
assume that they are designed to address the gender pay-gap. However, Article 119 EEC 
(now Article 157 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU) was not 
introduced to remedy the social ill of pay-discrimination but because rather due to concerns 
regarding competitive disadvantages of the Member States establishing the European 
Economic Community, and it ultimately constituted a political compromise between 
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Germany and France.56 Pay-discrimination as such, was not necessarily considered a social 
conflict requiring a legal remedy on national level. Even today, the European involvement in 
equality and non-discrimination may be fueled by both an interest to protect citizens from 
bigotry and sexism and the fact that there are few competing national concepts intertwined 
with the national legal traditions. This leaves space for the EU to demonstrate its commitment 
to social progress and legitimize further European (political) integration.57 The functions of 
the equality-directives are thus not necessarily clear and may be seen differently on national 
and European level. This, in turn, may explain why the equality directives had a limited effect 
after their implementation and only slowly gained visibility. For example, in Germany, only 
112 cases based on § 611a of the German Civil Code (old version), which prohibited sex 
discrimination within employment, were launched between 1982 and 2004.58 It may also 
explain the rather slow adoption of the more current equality directives banning 
discrimination on grounds of sex, sexuality, religion and belief, race and ethnic origin, age 
and disability,59 which are indeed deeply intertwined with national legal traditions.60 The 
European legal system may encourage developments along similar lines because European 
integration requires similar and rational legal solutions (natural processes of convergence).61 
However, Member States also face clear legal obligations to implement EU law. Similarities 
between national harmonized laws are not surprising, particularly when directives leave little 
discretion to the Member States.62 Functionalism thus seems ill-suited to compare EU legal 
systems. It struggles to identify the hierarchical co-dependencies that exist between the 
different European and national institutions and that influence legislative agendas within the 
multi-governmental structure.  
Similarly, the common core approach,63 which adopts a factual starting point, has little to add 
to the comparison of national legislation that implements European directives. It is 
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unsurprising that different Member States provide similar or identical legal solutions within 
an area that is legally harmonized. After all, Member States would face infringement 
procedures if they did not implement the directives.64 The CJEU has often stressed that 
proper implementation is necessary to ensure certainty and precision.65 However, that does 
not mean that these legal solutions provided in the statute books are ever used or actually 
mean the same within the national cultural context. Given the different procedural rules or 
non-legal matters of substance that can lead to major differences in other, slightly different, 
cases,66 a common core approach, like functionalism, is likely to overlook relevant 
divergences because it tends to exclude a large number of facts which are not strictly legal 
and only considers their meaning in relation to their effects in operational terms.67 Diversities 
in the theoretical and philosophical framework can make legal concepts rather different, even 
if singular results are similar or lead to similar results.68 Moreover, the question remains 
whether we can ever understand sterilized, fabricated, abstract factual scenarios removed 
from their social, economic, and cultural contexts.69 After all, directives are binding regarding 
the result to be achieved.70 The scenarios envisaged by the legislator should thus be covered 
by the directive and the law implementing it, even if alternative solutions are also available. 
However, real-life life application is often very different from what was envisaged during the 
drafting process. 
Challenges for the comparison:  
the judicial reception of harmonized law 
How to capture the different factors influencing the national application of harmonized law in 
a meaningful and feasible way is far from clear. Comparative law has long struggled with its 
own methodology.71 Post-modernist approaches, originating from legal realism,72 have 
challenged traditional approaches such as functionalism because of its lack of cultural 
awareness and apolitical approach towards law. However, the ‘nagging feeling’73 that it is 
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difficult, if not impossible, to understand different legal systems, has not stopped the 
discipline from advancing.74 Consequently, a paradoxical situation arises.75 On the one hand, 
there is a growing practice of substantive comparative work on the law of Member States, 
including harmonized law and legal transplants. On the other hand, there are highly 
theoretical debates regarding the shortcomings of current comparative law methods and the 
need to recognize the cultural diversity within which the law is embedded. The goal of this 
section is not to repeat this criticism or methodological advances. Instead, the section will 
discuss the usefulness of the different comparative law methods for the purpose of comparing 
the application of harmonized law. While there is a large tool set of possible approaches 
within comparative law,76 the discussion will focus on three approaches: functionalism, 
structuralism, and the postmodernist critique of comparative law. These approaches dominate 
current methodological debates and provide different, but potentially overlapping, solutions 
on how to compare and to what extent non-legal factors can (or should) be included in the 
comparison. They will be considered in the light of two key challenges posed by the 
comparison of harmonized law: the triangular relationship among the national courts of the 
EU Member States and the CJEU, and the integration of the national legal and non-legal 
context.  
The triangular relationship of the national courts and the CJEU 
The comparison of EU harmonized law is complicated by the relationship between the CJEU 
and the national courts,77 their different roles and functions and their shared responsibility 
regarding the application and interpretation of EU law. The Treaty authorizes the CJEU to 
interpret Union law.78 However, the national courts are in charge of deciding the merits of the 
case,79 and the CJEU leaves discretion to the national courts.80 They thus retain a substantial 
responsibility for ensuring that EU law is properly enforced, and they become ‘decentralized 
EU courts’81 with primary responsibility for the ‘effect utile of EU law.’82 The CJEU thus 
                                                 
74 Reinmann supra note 2, at 673. 
75 Maurice Adams and Jacco Bomhoff, Comparing law, in PRACTICE AND THEORY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1 
(2012); Palmer supra note 30, at 3. 
76 For an overview of different methods, see MATHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW (2014); JAAKKO HUSA, A NEW 
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2015); GEOFFREY SAMUEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
THEORY AND METHOD (2014); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mathias Reimann and Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2008). 
77 PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 164-65 (3rd ed. 2007). 
78 Art 19 TEU and 267 TFEU. 
79 Case 170/84, Bilka v Weber von Hartz EU:C:1986:204, 1986 E.C.R. 1607, at ¶ 36. 
80 This is true regarding, for example, objective justification within the concept of indirect (sex) discrimination. 
CHRISTA TOBLER, INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION (2005); Sacha Prechal, Combating Indirect Discrimination in 
Community Law Context, 20(1) LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION 81, 90 (1993); Philippa Watson, Equality of 
Treatment: A Variable Concept?, 24(1) INDUSTRIAL L. J. 33, 43-48 (1995); Dagmar Schiek supra note 28, at 357. 
81 Urszula Jaremba, At the Crossroad of National and European Union Law, 6(3/4) ERASMUS L. REV. 191, 192 
(2013); Juan A Mayoral et al., Creating EU Law judges, 21(8) J. EUR. PUBLIC POLICY 1120-1141 (2014). 
82 Ibid.  
  
depends on the national courts’ cooperation to ensure the effectiveness of EU law, while 
national courts have to consider the case law of the CJEU when they apply EU law. National 
courts thus belong to a trans-national and post-national community of courts, as they are 
linked to the CJEU and the courts of other Member States.83 A comparison focusing on the 
application of EU harmonized law needs to consider the effect of the relationship—and the 
consequential interconnection and dialogue—between the national courts and the CJEU.  
Primarily, the relationship between the national courts and the CJEU is institutionalized via 
the preliminary reference proceeding.84 Accordingly, a national court (of last instance) is 
required to request a ruling from the CJEU on the interpretation of EU law if it considers that 
a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give a judgment.85 There is thus direct 
communication between each national court that asks a question and the CJEU. However, the 
preliminary reference procedure is not limited to this. The additional multileveled 
intertwining influences become quite obvious if one pictures the dialogue between the 
national courts and the CJEU as triangular. Its simplified version,86 reducing the number of 
national courts to two, can help in visualizing the interconnection of the courts: the CJEU and 
the national court asking a 
preliminary question each sit on 
one vertex, while the second 
national court, representative of all 
the other national courts, sits on 
the third vertex.  
The triangular relationship then 
demonstrates that the CJEU, when 
giving judgment, influences all 
national courts beyond the court 
that is referring a preliminary 
question to the CJEU, as its ruling is relevant for all courts of the Member States.87 Thus, the 
relevance of a preliminary judgment is never restricted to the requesting court but extends to 
other national courts regarding the interpretation of EU law. Moreover, the effect of the 
preliminary reference procedure is not limited to top-down influences, because the national 
court asking the question influences not only the CJEU but also other national courts. Firstly, 
if national courts want to give effect to the CJEU’s preliminary rulings that originated from 
other Member States, they have to engage with the referring court’s argument, interpretation 
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and doctrinal problem to understand the original question and the CJEU’s ruling. Secondly, 
the European harmonization process encourages national courts to abandon purely internal 
perspectives on law and consider other national approaches, particularly regarding the 
application of harmonized law.88 When applying EU law, a national court is thus encouraged 
to consider the doctrinal or other legal problems that arise in different European legal orders 
in relation to their own national approaches. Moreover, other national legal systems whose 
courts are not directly involved in the preliminary reference can still influence the CJEU’s 
reasoning for two reasons: firstly, because all Member States can participate in the 
preliminary proceedings on EU level89 and, secondly, because the CJEU has to consider 
national legal paradigms and the doctrines of the different legal systems if it wants to ensure 
the effectiveness of EU law in all Member States.90 The influences thus go both ways along 
each side of the triangle, and it is difficult to separate top-down influences from cross-country 
and bottom-up effects. It is thus a ‘multi-layered’ or ‘multi-polar’ system,91 which encourages 
national courts to engage with other national courts’ judgments and legal systems as well as 
communication between the national courts and the CJEU. 
National courts being connected and engaging in dialogue with courts from other national 
States is of course not unique to the EU. National courts were always able and potentially 
accustomed to consider case law from other Nation-States. They may also be willing to go 
beyond the European context by considering the decision-making process of courts from non-
European jurisdictions and in legal areas outside the scope of EU law.92 English courts, for 
example, are often more willing to engage with other common law courts whose rulings are 
considered persuasive,93 while an engagement with the judgments of European civil law 
courts exist mainly, if at all, within the limits of European law.94 In the UK, for instance, the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council95 also goes beyond the national sphere, as it 
considers appeals from different national legal systems. It can be suggested that English 
courts already belong to a trans-national community that continues to flourish beyond and 
besides the European influence. Moreover, other international organizations, treaties and 
courts may encourage a dialogue between different national and international entities in a 
globalized world. However, the preliminary reference procedure in combination with the 
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supremacy of EU law further formalizes the process regarding the European context and 
forces unwilling courts to engage with other national courts’ judgments when they apply EU 
law in the light of the CJEU judgments, even if it is not made explicit in the reasoning of the 
court. A comparison of the application of EU harmonized law needs to allow space to 
identify and discuss this, potentially indirect, engagement with other national legal orders of 
the European Union. 
The structural interdependence of the national courts and the CJEU affects the possible 
framework in which the comparison can take place. Since EU law enjoys primacy over 
national law,96 it might be assumed that the CJEU’s case law establishes objective 
parameters97 to which national courts would gradually adapt. Within a comparative analysis, 
the CJEU’s case law could then be used as the external common denominator (tertium 
comparationis). Indeed, the CJEU as a supranational court is supposed to ensure the uniform 
application and interpretation of Union law, and it can do this in principle independently from 
the political and cultural context of the Member States.98 The cross-country comparison 
would then consider how different national courts adopt the CJEU interpretation that is 
constructed as the best (or at least European-wide) solution to a specific problem, to use 
functionalist terminology. Such an approach presupposes consistency. However, the CJEU’s 
interpretation of EU law does not happen in a context-free environment in which the CJEU 
can objectively pick the ‘best solution’, presuming such a solution exists, which is then 
gradually adopted by the courts of the Member States. On the contrary, the CJEU’s case law 
is frequently criticized for being incoherent, contradictory and merely reacting to individual 
cases.99 This arises from structural and functional issues. 
The ‘pre-federal’100 European structure leaves it to the national courts to decide how to ask 
preliminary questions and how much information they provide to the CJEU.101 National 
courts can thus significantly influence the development of EU law and CJEU decision-
making processes, particularly if it is in their interest to refuse cooperation or limit the 
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application of EU law at the national level.102 For example, the threat of the German 
Constitutional Court to uphold national constitutional standards of human rights103 forced the 
CJEU to engage with human rights and the principles underpinning them. This is not 
necessarily detrimental to the development of EU law. On the contrary, it has been suggested 
that the recognition of (national) human rights at the EU level has protected the integrity of 
the European legal order.104 However, the significant pressure national courts can use to 
influence the CJEU demonstrates that there is no clear hierarchy between them. The CJEU is 
not a Court of Appeal that can review the principles and interpretations adopted by national 
courts. Consequently, national courts and national legal systems significantly influence the 
CJEU, even if only indirectly via preliminary questions.105 Since courts of 28 (or once the 
UK leaves, 27) Member States can refer questions to the CJEU, these influences are 
manifold, diverse and potentially contradictory. This is not to say that CJEU case law is not 
important for national applications of harmonized law but simply that these cases cannot be 
viewed as an external framework or treated as providing one consistent solution to the 
interpretation of EU law. Instead, CJEU case law needs to be considered alongside other 
factors within a ‘complex network of norms and practices’.106 The shared responsibility of the 
CJEU and national courts means that there are continuous national and non-national 
influences which affect the application of the national law implementing the directives, which 
further underlines their hybrid character. Differently from other legal transplants,107 these 
laws are not freely adopted and the transplantation process and possible diffusion of the legal 
concepts is not only dependent on the recipient national legal system. 
A comparative method that engages with the application of harmonized law thus needs to 
mirror the dialogue of structural interdependence between the national courts and the 
CJEU.108 How to integrate this multi-layered transnational dialogue between the courts into a 
traditional cross-country comparison is far from clear, particularly because of the political 
dimension of the dialogue, which goes beyond simply developing and understanding the 
‘correct’ interpretation of European law. Modern functionalists recognize that there are areas 
of law where ‘adequate conceptual tools which are both common to the various legal systems 
and teleologically satisfactory’109 do not yet exist. Consequently, politically influenced areas 
of law may not be comparable, and the focus of comparatists’ efforts should be on private 
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‘apolitical’ law.110 Alternatively, comparative labor lawyers have emphasized the need for 
interdisciplinary cooperation. Accordingly, it is then necessary to consider a specific 
element’s interaction with all the other elements of the specific system to discover the true 
function.111 However, the consideration of ‘extra-legal’112 elements is not sufficient to 
properly integrate the political dimension of the courts’ dialogue, which often has very little 
to do with the particular harmonized rule in question and its purpose or function. Thus, 
regardless of whether law can ever be apolitical,113 at least the dialogue between the courts, if 
not EU law in general, is highly politicized.114 
The CJEU, on the one hand, reflects the general character of the European Union, which is 
essentially a political project focused on integration.115 The Court is thus generally 
recognized to be driven by a pro-integrationist agenda.116 Additionally, the involvement of 
the European Commission, the European Parliament and interest groups (including NGOs) 
has implications for EU governance.117 For example, individual activists and interest groups 
have successfully advanced gender equality via strategic litigation. Because of the direct 
effect of Article 157 TFEU (Article 141 EC), the national courts were forced to refer an 
increasing number of preliminary questions. This enabled the CJEU to develop its rather 
broad interpretation of sex equality, including issues related to pregnancy and gender, which 
in many Member States were part of national social policies and not employment law.118 The 
rigidity of the EU treaties does not encourage the CJEU to moderate its jurisprudence, as it 
does not need to fear amendments regarding its own jurisdiction.119 However, the successful 
implementation of new principles in Member States may also depend on the persuasiveness 
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of the CJEU’s reasoning within the broader national context. The CJEU uses various 
methodological approaches when interpreting Union law,120 but it also faces several problems 
different from those at the national level. For instance, it has to negotiate and interpret 
multilingual legal texts that differ from each other.121 It also faces different interpretations in 
the national legal orders of the Member States.122 If it wishes to create a persuasive coherent 
legal order and horizontal coherence between the Member States,123 the Court has to argue 
purposively and doctrinally. 
National courts, on the other hand, may have an interest in giving effect to EU law. Within 
the system of supremacy, national courts are able to follow the CJEU without waiting for 
their national parliaments or higher national courts to become active. This leads to the 
paradoxical situation where “lower” national courts or even quasi-judicial bodies gain new 
powers by sharing their power with a supranational entity.124 It is not surprising, then, that 
this doctrine of supremacy became widely accepted and that many landmark decisions of the 
CJEU originated from the preliminary questions of the lower national courts.125 However, 
national courts may also be concerned with preserving the integrity of the perceived 
coherence of the national system. In particular, higher national courts’ authoritative role 
interpreting national law may make them skeptical toward the influence of EU law. 
Consequently, they are more likely to refuse or limit cooperation with the CJEU. For 
example, the German Constitutional Court did not refer any preliminary questions to the 
CJEU until recently,126 and this has been interpreted by many as a step towards protecting the 
German prerogative rather than a ‘surrender of sovereignty’.127 Higher court referrals are 
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often technical in an attempt to block the CJEU from ‘judicial activism’.128 Their 
participation seems generally focused on protecting both their own authority129 and national 
influences on European legal developments.130 These concerns regarding EU law are not only 
relevant to national courts drafting and sending preliminary questions to the CJEU but also to 
the national application of EU law and national legislation implementing the directives. 
These political motivations that accrue out of a desire to ensure influence, power, and 
effectiveness and that influence the dialogue between the courts have to be considered within 
a comparative analysis of the application of harmonized law. This political dimension has to 
be considered when analyzing the national judicial reception of EU harmonized law, which 
goes beyond considering certain terminology or concepts within the ‘context of its structure 
and its functioning’.131 
The national legal and non-legal context 
While national courts are part of a post-national community of courts, they are also 
embedded in their national legal and non-legal economic, cultural, linguistic and political 
contexts. These contexts influence the courts’ dialogue with the CJEU,132 and they affect the 
courts’ application of EU harmonized law at the national level. National legal concepts and 
the cultural background thus remain important even if national courts will often be 
encouraged to adopt the CJEU reasoning rather than the national methods, particularly when 
directives are implemented rather literally.133 A method to compare harmonized law needs to 
recognize the national courts’ application of harmonized law within the national sphere. 
While national laws implementing the directives have the same EU origin and often use 
similar terminology and wording, and while the CJEU retains responsibility to interpret EU 
law, it is national courts that primarily apply harmonized law. The national courts’ legal 
approaches and reasoning determine the substantive meaning of the legislation at the national 
level and can either support or undermine a successful harmonization process. It is also 
within the application of the law on the national level where national legal, historic, cultural 
or political factors are particularly influential. 
While the dialogue itself is important, special attention has to be drawn to the national factors 
that influence the dialogue and the reception of the CJEU’s interpretation of EU law. This 
dialogue includes an exchange of messages as well as many ‘symbolic implications … 
hidden between the lines of national references and the CJEU decisions’.134 National courts 
are more likely to integrate the CJEU’s approach if its reasoning is persuasive and does not 
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contradict national legal concepts and paradigms.135 Due to the different socio-political and 
legal contexts of the Member States, there are variations in the effectiveness of EU law, as 
national courts choose different approaches when they adopt EU law, even though EU law, 
including CJEU case law, aims at ensuring a certain degree of harmonization.136 However, 
the CJEU’s persuasiveness is insufficient for the effective implementation and application of 
EU law at the national level. National courts are likely to hold on to their national 
approaches, whether focusing on doctrinal and positive law137 or taking for themselves a 
more persuasive approach.  
Supranational aims are thus important at the national level, but the effectiveness of the 
CJEU’s case law also depends on the national (legal) background.138 National courts are less 
likely to integrate European concepts that are foreign to the national legal system. This can 
create problems for an effective harmonization process. For example, the EU may be 
particularly active in non-discrimination law because it faces little competition with national 
concepts in national legal traditions.139 However, the lack of similar legal institutions 
applying to national social or labor law may also hinder the adoption of the approaches 
developed by the CJEU, as they may be perceived as unnecessary, unconstitutional or poorly 
reasoned. For example, national legal systems with strong labor law protection often address 
issues related to equality by other protective measures140 or address them collectively without 
creating individual rights. The CJEU is in a dilemma. On the one hand, once asked by a 
national court to provide a certain interpretation,141 the CJEU needs to go beyond the 
classical teleological approach in order to ensure Union law is effective within the Member 
States,142 because it needs to consider the meaning and development of the legal rules within 
the different Member States in order to develop persuasive interpretations.143 This includes 
cultural developments in Member States and approaches taken by national (constitutional) 
courts.144 The structure of and influences on Union legislation combined with the cooperation 
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between national courts and the CJEU145 may make it difficult for the Court to be less bold 
and still fulfill its task to provide a dynamic interpretation of EU law and foster 
harmonization.146 On the other hand, the Court is criticized for going beyond a teleological 
interpretation of Union law and legal activism.147 Progressive interpretations that enhance the 
rights of citizens but limit the ‘Member States’ prerogatives’148 can lead to the rejection of 
the ruling at the national level. Whether the CJEU’s reasoning is considered persuasive in a 
particular case still depends on the national context. To ensure a unified application and 
interpretation of Union law in all Member States, the CJEU needs to find a compromise that 
takes into account the different national legal systems and social developments in the 
Member States, as well as the aims of the Union legislation. These compromises will be 
imperfect, as it is extremely difficult to develop an approach that will be accepted by all 
national systems. The CJEU’s success regarding the effectiveness of EU law thus varies 
widely between domestic jurisdictions. Functionalism has, of course, not been blind to 
cultural influences: Rabel has already emphasized the need to encompass countries’ histories, 
cultures and religions,149 to name a few. However the subsequent request to be ‘realistic’150 
and to strip the solutions from their ‘conceptual context’ and ‘national doctrinal overtones so 
they may be seen purely in the light of their functions’151 begs the question of how important 
context really is within the functionalist analysis. Thus, functionalism’s focus is often on 
legal concepts that are detached from the wider context of law and subjected to ‘cognitive 
control’.152 Overall, the focus on similarities, which is expressed in functionalists’ 
praesumptio similitudinis and assumes that legal systems often produce very similar results 
even if by different means, 153 seems ill suited to uncover these different national influences 
that affect the application of EU harmonized law.  
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Methodological responses to the complexity 
Structuralism, usually associated with Sacco and the ‘Trento Manifesto’,154 takes into account 
various elements that influence legal rules and the interpretations given by national judges in 
its comparative approach. Borrowing from linguistics,155 Sacco called these influences legal 
formants. They include visible influences, such as academic writing and the legislator’s 
intent, and less-visible crypto-types (i.e., non-verbalized factors156), such as political or 
philosophical views and legal paradigms. Legal formants are thus the elements at work, and 
the ‘relationship between these elements […] makes the structure of the system’.157 This 
approach seems to be useful for the focus on the judicial reception of national rules because it 
emphasizes the difference between doctrine and operative rules158 on the one hand and 
analysis of the ‘elements at work’ on the other; and it observes exactly how jurists deal with 
‘specific rules and general categories’.159 It can expose the creative power of judges to 
interpret, apply or circumvent legislation160 and illuminate the limits of legislation in general 
and the harmonization process in particular. Thus, the approach emphasizes that the 
persuasiveness is not only relevant regarding the CJEU’s interpretation of EU law but also 
regarding the law itself, which needs to be experienced as a ‘great social breakthrough’.161 
Structuralism draws from linguistics, history, politics, culture, sociology and economic 
differences in order to reveal how ‘legal formants’ are in constant competition with each 
other. These influences, which may be independent from social needs, are not always 
obvious, and they usually survive substantive law reforms. They are intrinsic to the legal 
system.162 By including such explicit and implicit influences, structuralism provides reasons 
as to why national legal regimes function differently even though their wording is similar or 
when, in the case of EU law, they originate from the same set of rules. Its focus on diverse 
influences on the law is very useful because it challenges the monolithic understanding of law 
as a unitary structure, without inconsistencies and long-lasting diversions.163 However, 
structuralism poses some challenges. It aims at uncovering those influences, their 
interdependence and their different weightings. Within the intra-European context, where 
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legal systems are relatively similar at least in comparison to non-European systems,164 this 
means that formants that are specific to each system can be more easily revealed than those 
that Member States have in common. Once identified, the question is how to analyze, weight 
or interpret the formants and connect them in a meaningful way. It has for example been 
suggested that it is extremely difficult to establish a ‘retraceable relationship’ between 
them.165 Moreover, diversity is not assumed for all aspects of the law. Sacco suggests that 
conceptual or descriptive differences between legal systems do not necessarily extend to 
‘operational rules’166 The question is then how these differences as well as similarities can be 
explained and whether there are indeed areas of law which are apolitical and what that means 
for the comparison. Finally, structuralists assume it is possible to objectively assess foreign 
legal orders without being biased by their own cultural background. Like functionalism, they 
thus stress the scientific nature of the method and its objectivity.167 This assumption has been 
challenged by post-modernist or critical comparatists. If structuralism includes unspoken 
legal rules in its comparative analysis, critical comparison emphasizes the existence of 
unconscious rules.168 The post-modernist approach emphasizes the different socio-historic 
and socio-cultural influences and analysis of the legal system as a whole in order to uncover 
‘epistemological assumptions’ and deep differences between the legal systems.169 It 
challenges comparative studies to identify ‘cognitive limitations’,170 to turn ‘the gaze of 
comparison back on itself’,171 and to abandon familiar legal terms. As such, it aims to 
challenge both the idea of a politically neutral normative structure of the law and the rational 
application of doctrines and provisions by judges.172 It asks us to recognize power structures 
and consider sociological theories, self-reflection and critical evaluations to appreciate law as 
a part of, not separate from, social reality and the national legal mentalité.173 It challenges us 
to question the way we construct reality to subject it to ‘cognitive control’,174 and it suggests 
that cultural immersion is necessary for a comparison.175 Eventually, what is needed is 
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‘reflexivity’176 or ‘reflexive comparison’.177 These insights are of course not all new. 
Comparatists have always emphasized the relevance of culture. It is also doubtful whether 
culture should indeed be understood as homogeneous and static rather than diverse and 
dynamic.178 After all, law and legal culture have changed and developed overtime.179 
However, a comparison of the judicial reception of European harmonized law needs to 
engage with differences, rather than reduce or diminish their relevance, if it wants to 
understand some of the reasons for the perceived diversity. The focus on legal and non-legal 
cultural contexts advocated by critical comparatists can help alter this mind-set.180 The 
emphasis on unspoken and unconscious rules,181 which encourages reflective comparison, 
can help detect differences within the legal system and encourages culturally-sensitive 
comparison, thus avoiding the urge to favor unification over differences. The following 
discussion will consider how some of these insights may be useful for the comparison of the 
judicial reception of EU harmonized law, with a focus on the area of non-discrimination 
within employment and equality law. 
How should the judicial reception of harmonized law be compared? 
Critical or post-modernist,182 comparatists like Frankenberg183 have emphasized the need to 
be culturally aware, provide room for the several multi-layered legal and non-legal influences 
and consider the individual biases of the comparatists and the framework in which the 
comparison takes place. The following will discuss how these insights may be included in a 
comparison of the judicial reception of harmonized law, with a focus on the area of non-
discrimination within employment and equality law. The method proposed here tries to 
achieve a sound analysis by taking a three-step approach. The first step determines the 
theoretical and normative framework of the comparative field and identifies the boundaries of 
the case law analysis. Philosophical and normative considerations are included here. The 
second step assesses some aspects of the legal, historical and cultural background of the 
countries under comparison, focusing on those that are relevant to the development and 
application of the harmonized law at the national level and the European influences upon it. 
The last step is the case law analysis itself, potentially including decisions of quasi-judicial 
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bodies where such is warranted by the judicial and enforcement architectures of the 
respective legal systems. This analysis of domestic case law incorporates the different 
influences identified in the earlier steps and the relevant case law of the CJEU in order to 
provide a comprehensive picture of the application of the harmonized law within the national 
context. This multi-layered three-step approach makes it possible to draw sound conclusions 
that recognize normative and political considerations, the national courts’ relationship with 
the CJEU and national influences on case law. These three steps will be now discussed in 
more detail.  
The first step: The normative framework 
The first step defines the theoretical and normative framework in which the comparison takes 
place. Thus, it does not undertake a comparison but defines the focus and the framework for 
the comparison. As such, it is not neutral but can provide some critical foundation. For 
example, comparing national approaches toward pregnancy discrimination would require 
theorizing pregnancy discrimination (as direct or indirect); the concept of formal equality and 
broader, more-substantive approaches;184 and sex and gender discrimination and the critical 
assessment of it within feminist and queer theory. However, equality law could also be 
analyzed, for example, from an economic perspective, which would require a choice of 
normative standard, such as social welfare, reduction of economic inequality, or redistributive 
efficiency. Other areas of harmonized law may invite the consideration of other theoretical 
and normative aspects. Thus, consumer protection law may require the consideration of 
consumer theory, behavioral economics, or psychology, etc. Specific areas of commercial 
law and regulation, such as procurement law, may require the consideration of other types of 
economic theories, such as trade theory or macroeconomic interventions. The choice of 
theoretical framework thus depends on the research focus of the comparison. 
The purpose of providing a theoretical framework is twofold. Firstly, it creates an external 
common comparative denominator (tertium comparationis) for the comparison and thus 
provides an alternative for the functional approach. The great contribution functionalism has 
made is that it provides an answer to the contentious question of what one should compare; 
the comparison should include rules that have the same function. This approach is supposed 
to ensure that one does not miss legal or non-legal mechanisms that are alternative solutions 
to the same problem just because they look different. It thus indicates how to start, but it can 
be problematic because of its a priori assumptions about law and its functions.185 
Nevertheless, for a comparison to be feasible, it needs a commonly defined framework to 
limit the analysis. Thus, the legal comparison can be reduced to certain aspects, depending on 
the comparatist’s interest and research question. 
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A detailed engagement with the theoretical framework makes it possible to recognize the 
adaption of certain approaches. For example, the CJEU has recognized the link between 
pregnancy and sex discrimination, because only women can become pregnant.186 This 
demonstrates that EU non-discrimination law is capable of supporting substantive sex 
equality because it imposes a duty to treat women and men equally or to ensure equal 
opportunities despite biological differences. However, the Court has not been consistent in its 
approach and has not extended the same logic to pregnancy-related illnesses after 
childbirth.187 The focus on special protection for pregnant women thus remains, and it limits 
the potential substantive value of the law. Pregnancy discrimination can then be 
conceptualized within the broader issue of gender equality, as it helps theorize the causes of 
pregnancy discrimination and can be reflected in the national courts’ adoption of the CJEU’s 
approach or alternative approaches. After all, women do not just suffer pregnancy 
discrimination because they may be temporarily absent from or unable to perform certain 
work during pregnancy, they also suffer discrimination because of their presumed gender role 
once they are mothers. Theorizing the legal area of comparison (here, pregnancy 
discrimination) and placing EU law (here, EU sex discrimination law) within it can provide a 
critical framework for and limit the scope of further comparison.  
Furthermore, the theoretical considerations can possibly be adopted (or rejected) by the 
courts. It can thus inform the courts’ judgments and analysis of the national courts and/or the 
outcomes of the cases, as it would provide a theoretical underpinning of the harmonized law 
and the likely substantive aims of the directives. National courts would be able to refer to the 
theoretical concepts to underpin their understanding of the legislation and its scope even if 
traditionally a different concept or approach towards equality has been dominant within the 
national legal context.  
This is also connected to the second reason why the establishment of a theoretical and 
normative framework is necessary. Critical comparatists have challenged the assumption of 
neutral or objective comparison, and that places the comparing scholar at the center of 
criticism. For example, Frankenberg identifies four different dimensions of comparative law, 
with distinctive ethics, politics and methods placed on a larger grid. The grid’s horizontal axis 
demarks the polar extremes of detachment and commitment; the vertical axis demarks the 
polar extremes similarity and differences. Functionalism, for example, falls within the 
dimension that favors ‘cognitive control and focuses on Country and Western Styles’, which 
include ideas of detachment and similarity.188 Functionalism assumes a priori the similarity of 
social conflicts, legal solutions and the role of law within society. It often engages in 
positivist methods of comparison that separate the comparatist from the comparison, exercise 
cognitive control by preventing self-reflection, create global typologies, and absorb limited 
data. Its western focus favors assimilation and marginalizes the other.189 Other dimensions he 
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identifies are the following: Universalist approaches, which combine ideas of similarity and 
commitment; approaches which combine ideas of commitment and difference by engaging 
into ‘sentimental journeys’ into the foreign; and skeptical approaches, which combine ideals 
of difference and detachment.190 The comparison is thus not ‘politically agnostic’,191 and the 
ethics and ideals of the comparatist color the comparison. Frankenberg then suggests that at 
the center square of the grid, where the vertical and horizontal axes meet, the usual pitfalls 
might be avoided by encouraging a dialogue among the different counter-pulls and (legal) 











Determining the theoretical framework can help in this task. It recognizes that 
methodological choices are not neutral, and it enables the comparatist to reflect on the ethical 
and political agenda behind the comparatist’s own project, which is not necessarily limited to 
the four key dimensions mentioned above. European harmonization projects strive towards 
similarity and assimilation. Comparative studies within that field thus often fall within the 
Western-focused cognitive control dimension. Harmonization through directives separates 
the legal rules from the socio-economic context and suggests that it can be easily transplanted 
without recognition of the broader historic and cultural context of the different legal systems. 
However, directives also aim to achieve certain substantive legal standards. These standards 
have to be the subject of the comparative dialogue. The discussion of a theory underpinning 
the law and the concepts used exposes the comparatist’s own normative point of view, which 
is the starting point of the comparatist’s analysis. For example, if one wants to compare non-
discrimination law, it is important to reflect on and disclose how one theorizes group and 
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individual disadvantages linked to the protected characteristics, and what constitutes and 
includes formal and substantive equality.  
The second step: the national context 
The second step engages with the national context and aims to identify national legal and 
non-legal cultural factors that potentially influence the judicial reception of EU harmonized 
law on a national level. It ends with the hypotheses that can be tested in the third step. 
Structuralism has taught us that there is no black letter rule but that case law is always 
influenced by visible and crypto-typical ‘legal formants’. Any comparative analysis requires 
an awareness of the different influences on the law and their importance. However, 
structuralism takes a formal approach towards legal formants referring to linguistics to 
underline the scientific value of structuralism as an empirical method.194 It does not clearly 
explain how these formants can be identified and structured objectively.195 References made 
by critical comparatists to the need for ‘cultural immersion’196 and recognition of ‘legal 
mentalité’197 emphasize the need to consider the cultural context within which the application 
of the law takes place. There is thus a need for context sensitivity, to go beyond the ‘surface 
of law and court rulings’.198 This is relevant, even if one rejects the idea that national (legal) 
culture is homogeneous as such and believe in cross-cultural influences and developments. 
However, deep engagement with the national cultural context yields a number of difficulties. 
Firstly, it is unclear what the scope of the cultural investigation should be, letting alone that it 
is probably only possible to truly ‘immerse’ with a limited number of cultures, if at all.199 
Secondly, it is unclear how the sheer endlessness of information should be addressed. 
Overload can make information meaningless, and a feasible method certainly needs to allow 
for some limitations. Accordingly, this article proposes a flexible approach to allow space for 
dialogue between different cultural narratives and layers influencing the national application 
of harmonized law.200 The suggestion is thus not to consider national cultures generally but 
only in relation to the harmonized law compared and the substantive or minimum standard 
the directives try to ensure. Obviously, this will add a certain degree of subjectivity to the 
comparisons because the choices made and the factors considered relevant depend on the 
comparatist’s own outlook. However, explicitly highlighting and explaining the choices made 
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can increase the transparency of the comparison and further define its scope and what aspects 
to consider. 
To uncover the relevant cultural, historic and legal differences, it makes sense to engage with 
a number of parallel narratives on the harmonized law that emerge on a national level. One 
needs to go beyond the purely legal debate. Historic evidence can expose the number of 
narratives. The harmonized law in question may have been rejected or favored by the 
Member State’s government, academics or the wider public for specific legal or cultural 
reasons. The adoption and implementation process of the harmonized law on a national level 
and the public discourse around it can reveal much about national political and cultural self-
understanding and the role of certain legal concepts within that discourse.201 These diverse 
perceptions and perspectives should become obvious if one engages with the historic 
development and commentary on the harmonized law and the implementation process. 
Evidence for that can be found in newspaper articles, parliamentary debates and academic 
commentary, all of which should expose problems and obstacles regarding the legislation in 
question and shed light on how the harmonized law is conceptualized in the broader national 
debate.  
Once commentary related to the legislation in question is considered, the comparatist should 
feel invited to go beyond the legal focus and consider the substantive protection aimed at by 
the harmonized law from a non-legal angle. It could, for example, be relevant to investigate 
how the wider social movement interprets and supports the aims set out in the directives. For 
that, the substantive standards set by the directive and the theoretical underpinning of the 
legislation becomes relevant. For example, regarding the sex-equality directives, it is relevant 
to stress how the feminist movement has engaged with it, how much support such legislation 
has enjoyed within groups of different stakeholders and how influential they have been. It 
matters whether the national feminist movement predominantly considers non-discrimination 
law as ensuring and protecting women’s economic independence or as imposing the male 
standard on women. Perhaps law has not featured highly in the movement’s consciousness at 
all. Other non-legal solutions, such as collective agreements diverse forms of (legal) 
protection and special social support, rank highly in the Scandinavian socio-economic and 
legal system, for example.202 Employment standards are thus not always ensured by 
legislation, and the national discourse regarding the need and the possibility to ensure a 
certain substantive level of protection may not be a predominantly legal debate. Similarly, it 
matters whether the social movement acts within the existing legal frameworks and tries to 
achieve wider access to the available protection or whether there is a dominant interest to 
challenge the legal institutions. These priorities within the movement can inform us about the 
status and recognition of the substantive aim the directives try to achieve within the national 
context. For example, there is a difference in priorities if the LGBT movement predominantly 
tries to gain access to the institution of marriage to enjoy the special and often constitutional 
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protection afforded the traditional heteronormative family or whether there is a focus on 
challenging the existence of the institution itself.203  
Engaging with these different debates can tell us what other legal or non-legal mechanisms 
that may also tackle the same subject matter rank high in the national consciousness. All of 
this historical evidence can further expose how a broad number of stakeholders interested in 
the standards and protection aimed at by the harmonized law view the law itself and the 
usefulness of law in general or that law in particular for the wider purpose. These narratives 
can then allow us to draw more-general conclusions about the national identity and 
consciousness in relation to the legal area in question. They are thus relevant even if these 
social movements and stakeholders have indirect or only limited influence on the 
implementation process or the application of EU harmonized law. In particular, engaging 
these overlapping and multi-layered narratives can help us understand our own position in 
relation to the other204 and may lessen the effect of cultural bias because it helps translate 
concepts and the role of law within society. The second step should thus engage with the 
discursive character of law within the broader society. Referring to Derrida,205 Legrand asks 
us to engage with the relationship between text and meaning. The use of similarly sounding 
terminology or concepts in different legal systems does not imply that they actually mean the 
same thing. Rather, they are incommensurable, because both are embedded within one’s own 
cultural context.206 For the current purposes, this means that the directives, once they reach 
the national sphere and are implemented, ultimately adopt a national coloring.  While it may 
not be possible to overcome this cultural subjectivity, a focus on legal culture or mentalité is 
necessary to appreciate each legal system as unique and to uncover differences regarding the 
role of law, how people think about law and how this may differ from one’s own conception 
of law in general and the harmonized law in particular.207 However, one has to be careful not 
to reach solutions too quickly. This is also significant, because law implementing EU 
directives, just like other transplants, is not necessarily congruent with society. Mentalité 
alone may not be sufficient to explain the national application, as different and possibly 
contradictory forces or formants affect the legal application and interpretation. This step 
should not be considered a concluding verdict on the different legal cultures but simply the 
development of a hypothesis regarding the factors influencing the national reception of the 
harmonized law in question. This hypothesis can then be tested in the third step.  
Once a comparative study leaves the doctrinal legal arena and attempts to consider the 
‘richness of law’208 by considering its cultural context and ramifications, the question arises 
of how to limit the information to keep the analysis feasible. This work proposes a pragmatic 
approach that accepts that the comparative analysis always engages only a limited number of 
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aspects anyway. It is thus a choice made by the comparatist that needs to be communicated in 
clear terms. For example, within the comparison of national approaches towards pregnancy 
discrimination, one may want to include national cultural, legal and historical factors linked 
to the legal area and exclude other areas such as economic factors. The CJEU has identified 
several purposes with regards to EU non-discrimination law, and it originally stressed its 
economic and social aims. The economic aim was ‘to avoid a situation where undertakings 
established in [Member] States which have […] implemented [non-discrimination law] suffer 
a disadvantage in the intra-union competition as compared with undertakings established in 
States which have not yet eliminated discrimination.’209 The field’s economic aim would thus 
be to prevent the distortion of competition.210 Contemporary case law views the economic 
aim as secondary and stresses instead the social rights and the right of equal treatment 
consonant with the human rights framework.211 Nevertheless, one may be inclined to consider 
economic aims relevant because it is difficult to conceptualize European integration without 
economic considerations.212 However, on the national level, the main economic concern 
related to gender equality and non-discrimination law is that of cost. National legislators may 
want to reduce protection to ensure that the national market is competitive or has a 
competitive advantage. Beyond that, national non-discrimination law belongs to social and 
labor law. It is thus not implemented because of competiveness per se. It should thus be 
possible to consider non-discrimination law without including considerations related to the 
European aim of economic competitiveness. This is not to suggest that the economic context 
may not be relevant but rather that limitations can be justified depending on the aims of the 
comparison. After all, there is value in accepting ‘responsibility for [the] strategic decisions 
[taken] rather than reflexively implementing a given methodological agenda’.213  
Beyond that, it is helpful to consider the development of national legislation and the 
academic and public debate on the substantive issues the directives try to achieve and to 
uncover cultural, legal or historic factors that influence the debate and possibly the 
application of the harmonized law. The following will demonstrate how the possibly different 
narratives can be picked apart and limited using the Dutch and German context in relation to 
EU non-discrimination law as examples. Germany and the Netherlands were in a rather 
similar situation when sex discrimination law first appeared on the European political and 
legal agendas. Both countries celebrated the breadwinner concept, which presumed the 
mother’s and wife’s place to be in the home. However, with the rise of the feminist 
movement, the question of sex equality was soon conceptualized in rather different terms. 
While the Dutch movement particularly emphasized the need for equal pay and equal 
treatment and referred to the Anglo-Saxon approach towards equality, the German movement 
framed the right to equality within the national constitutional sphere and emphasized the need 
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for special protection and equal recognition of ‘typical female work’.214 This indicates that 
different national paradigms and cultural understandings of equality influence the debate. 
Within these debates, repeated references to certain concepts of national identity and 
consciousness can be identified. Thus, repeated references to constitutional principles and 
values or the need for tolerance and equal protection despite different life choices can 
indicate common social and cultural values, which can then be further explored by 
considering the sociological and historic research on the subject. Thus, once one notices the 
repeated reference to constitutional values within the German discourse on equality, one may 
want to consider the role of the constitution within society in more general terms. This will 
quickly direct the comparatist towards the concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’ usually 
associated with Habermas,215 which provides further indication of the German post-war 
society and identity. Similarly, once it is noted that tolerance and consensus traditionally 
ranked high in the Dutch political debate, one may start to look at the development of the 
political system and will quickly identify the political pillarization and the development of 
the ‘polder model’, as well as the consequent importance of tolerance within the national 
cultural identity.216 These concepts can then be analyzed regarding their possible effect on 
equality law in general and the EU non-discrimination law in particular.  
A second strand of inquiry may be the consideration of national and international legal 
paradigms on equality and non-discrimination that may compete with the European version 
imposed by the harmonized law and the wider national legal context. This includes 
constitutional protection, ILO conventions, and other legal concepts. Functionalism can be 
helpful in choosing the legal concepts for consideration. Thus, one may want to look at other 
national concepts that also protect equality and prohibit non-discrimination and can thus 
possibly have a similar function or aim as the harmonized law in question. However, other 
laws that may have a different function but can be affected by the harmonized law are also 
relevant. For example, German labor law has long recognized a general equal treatment 
principle within employment law (arbeitsrechtliche Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz), which in 
some situations achieves the same result as the EU directives but is conceptually rather 
different because, for example, it accepts economic justifications and does not apply to 
recruitment.217 Similarly, Dutch courts have addressed some pay discrepancy via the concept 
of the ‘good employer and employee’,218 which imposes duties of reasonableness, fair dealing 
and good faith on employment relationships.219 Similarly, the constitutional equality 
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principle, along with its scope and effect on private relationships, needs to be considered as 
well as other dominant legal concepts. For example, the protection of marriage, family, and 
motherhood220 also provides some protection to women, particularly regarding maternity and 
pregnancy, although often in quite different ways than the equality directives. The more 
general legal attitude towards EU supremacy and the effect of international agreements may 
be relevant too. For example, Germany, relying on dualism, and the Netherlands, relying on 
monism, regarding the impact of international law (which also colors the application of EU 
law) can affect the application of EU harmonized law. Moreover, national (doctrinal) 
paradigms, such as the hierarchy of the law or the distinction between public and private 
law221 may also be considered. However, these concepts should not be considered separately 
from the cultural discourse. To appreciate the richness of law,222 the concepts need to be 
linked to the broader social and cultural implications. It is thus important to recognize what 
these laws can tell us about the cultural framework and what their social ramifications are. 
There is thus a need to go beyond the legal analysis when considering the legal concepts. 
A third strand of inquiry should be the legal academic discourse on the implemented law and 
the relevant directives, as this can reveal real obstacles for the application of the harmonized 
law at the national level as well as the legal consciousness or mentality of the compared 
countries. Here, legal consciousness does not refer to ‘legal hegemony …or… how the law 
sustains its institutional power’,223 which would be a more general analysis of the legal 
cultures. Instead, it refers to cultural factors (i.e., cultural identity, which is influenced by 
national history and common cultural values) that influence the legal reasoning and 
application of the harmonized law. For example, factors such as the cultural role of the 
German constitution or the Dutch ‘culture of tolerance’224 can clearly affect the application of 
harmonized non-discrimination law, giving clues to the general mentality of the national 
(legal) system, cultural self-understanding and, subsequently, the role of non-discrimination 
law within it. It can also determine the framework in which national debates on EU non-
discrimination law are framed. Thus, unsurprisingly, both supporters and opponents of 
horizontal equality law in Germany consider themselves defenders of the constitution and its 
conceived values and concept of equality.225 
A fourth strand of inquiry could be the de facto influence of the social movement and other 
stakeholders promoting equality in the political discourse and legal development. This 
includes, for example, the role of trade unions and other parts of civil society and groups of 
activists. For example, the Dutch feminist movement had significantly more influence on the 
political agenda than the German political movement because of being included in the 
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political debate via consultations, procedures and committees.226 Such factors reveal common 
cultural values, the overall status of the legislation and the influences on the implementation 
process. 
Finally, the implemented law itself needs to be considered. In that regard, it is of course 
relevant how the law is implemented (e.g., via primary or secondary legislation) and whether 
it is in a separate statute or integrated in a wider piece of legislation or code. Discrepancies 
between directives and implemented national legislation as well as the extent to which the 
national legislator used its discretion in case of minimum harmonization directives need to be 
considered. This is not to overemphasize the focus on written law or invite a legocentric 
analysis. A detailed comparison of the implemented law would indeed be meaningless 
because it tells us little about the judicial application or the status or socio-economic context 
of the implemented law. Directives can be implemented but never applied or invoked.227 
However, legislation cannot be ignored, as national courts, despite their creative power of 
interpretation and even if they have taken a more flexible approach in earlier decisions, may 
return to a literal interpretation of the rules later on due to a new set of circumstances.228 
Legal definitions matter. For example, the Dutch General Equal Treatment Act (Algemene 
wet gelijke behandeling, AWGB) refers to ‘making a difference’ (onderscheid) rather than 
discrimination because it was felt that the term ‘discrimination’ implies a serious moral 
wrong that would limit the law’s effectiveness229 and it has been argued that this terminology 
inflates its meaning, taking it beyond the scope of discrimination.230 On the other hand, one 
could also argue that the term ‘discrimination’ as such only determines that one has made a 
distinction based on specific criteria and is thus not a moral wrong per se. Rather, only a 
distinction based on specific criteria, such as race and sex, is socially undesirable. Differences 
in terminology, definition of legal concepts, and the meaning attached to them may very 
much be relevant for effective implementation and successful judicial reception. The national 
legislation to consider is that which implements the directives, but it may also go beyond if 
the directives’ influence goes beyond what had to be implemented. For example, the UK 
introduced equality law long before it faced EU obligations to do so; nevertheless, the 
Equality Act 2010 is influenced by the EU equality directives.231 Similarly, the Dutch AWGB 
from 1994 already prohibited discrimination on grounds of civil status, sexual orientation and 
race and thus went beyond the EU scope of protection. Germany, which only implemented 
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the General Equal Treatment Act232 in 2006 and after significant EU pressure, also provides a 
broader scope of protection than the EU equality directives by providing protection from 
discrimination outside employment for all protected characteristics. Nevertheless, the legal 
development and the legal reasoning regarding the protection of all grounds is influenced by 
the EU law on sex discrimination even if there was no direct EU obligation.  
The national debate regarding the legislation and equality should then be considered 
regarding their ethical and political dimension. Thus, once the different dimensions of the 
national debate on non-discrimination law are considered, they can be structured by different 
ethical or political points of view. Frankenberg demonstrates this by considering different 
arguments concerned with the public use of Muslim veils, which he analyzes within the 
abovementioned grid of detachment/commitment (horizontal axis) and similarity/difference 
(vertical axis).233 The Muslim veil can be viewed as a threat and a foreign object that needs to 
be tolerated unless there are competing interests at stake; it can also be viewed as a universal 
symbol of female oppression women need to be protected from, or as a fascinating symbol of 
personal choice and exotic culture and religion; or its real meaning and symbolism as well as 
its policing can be viewed with skepticism and doubt.234 These different perspectives can then 
disrupt the ‘stereotypical image’ of Muslim veils, illuminate legal ‘implications of 
intervention’, and consider how ‘veiled women are represented in the normative and 
comparative discourse’.235 Such an analysis focusing on the pubic use of Muslim veils can 
certainly deconstruct the Western bias and identity superiority.236 However as a heuristic 
device, the grid and the different forms and arguments that emerge regarding a given, socially 
contentious and controversial area with legal and cultural implications can also be used in the 
European context. This is certainly true considering racial and religious discrimination but 
also regarding other areas where there is not such a clear conflict between what one may call 
Western and non-Western ideologies and lifestyles. For example, discussion around sex and 
sexual equality can also be framed in terms of traditional versus modern lifestyles that need 
to be tolerated; the universal need to protect women from oppression, which can be defined in 
certain terms; the celebration of different (fe)male choices and traits, which need to be 
protected; or skepticism regarding the meaning of sex equality, choice and control of these. 
The second step of the analysis can identify the different arguments emerging within the 
national discourse on the area of harmonized law. This seems particularly fruitful for areas of 
harmonized law that are politically contentious and reach deep into the national cultural 
identity, such as equality and labor law.  
                                                 
232 Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz [AGG] [General Equal Treatment Act], legislative proposal, BT Drs 
[Papers of the German Parliament ]16/1780 (08.06.2006); final bill (2006) BGBl [Federal Gazette] I Nr. 39, 
1897, available at: 
http://www.antidiskriminierungsstelle.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/publikationen/agg_in_englischer_Sprache
.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 
233 See above, text around supra note 188. 
234 Frankenberg supra note 22, at 117-161. 
235 Ibid, 161. 
236 Ibid, 162. 
  
Once these different relevant strands of inquiry are followed, the comparatist should be able 
to develop hypotheses regarding factors that influence the judicial reception of the 
harmonized law. These hypotheses can then be considered in the last step of the comparison, 
considering to what extent these national debates and factors are reflected in judicial 
reasoning. 
The third step: case law analysis 
The final step, focusing on case law (including courts and possibly quasi-judicial bodies’ 
decisions), reveals how different factors influence legal decision-making and remain 
dominant despite pressure to adopt approaches that conform to European law. Case law 
analysis demonstrates how courts come to conclusions and the factors they deem relevant.237 
Focusing on the judicial reception of harmonized law, i.e., case law, is one way to consider 
the effectiveness of harmonized law. Of course, a focus on case law is not new. In fact, 
functionalism very much emphasizes that one needs to go beyond the law-in-the-books and 
instead consider the law-in-action,238 which then often means a focus on courts’ decisions. 
Critical scholars have then suggested that comparative law should go beyond the focus on 
case structure and methods of legal interpretation employed by the courts.239 However, within 
the area of harmonized law, it still makes sense to consider case law because it is one 
indicator of how EU directives, once implemented, function within the national legal context.  
Critical insights may, however, be valuable for the evaluation of case law. In particular, the 
analysis should go beyond the comparison of the application of specific concepts or legal 
reasoning in particular situations. After all, given the CJEU’s influences on the interpretation 
of harmonized law, it is not surprising that certain concepts are interpreted and applied in 
similar fashion. This is particularly true regarding issues where the CJEU has given a clear 
ruling. For example, it is clear that under EU law, women may keep secret their pregnancy 
during the job application process240 because pregnancy discrimination constitutes sex 
discrimination.241 National courts ignoring such clear statements of the CJEU would be hard 
pressed to justify such an open rebellion. However, that does not mean that national courts do 
not recolor the implemented law and put their national spin on it. To see these national and 
European influences at work, this article proposes taking a step back and considering broader 
court narratives that are not concerned with details of abstract legal concepts or categories.  
Case law narratives can, for example, be structured by focusing on case-sagas that involve a 
number of preliminary rulings on the related legal issues. For example, German courts have 
repeatedly asked preliminary questions regarding the rights of part-time workers to equal 
treatment in respect of rules based on the standard full-time employee. This has included 
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issues related to trade union activities that allowed the employee to be absent from work242 
and to what constitutes overtime for the purpose of overtime pay.243 In addition to cases that 
have triggered preliminary references, courts on all levels have applied the EU law in 
question and potentially given effect to the CJEU’s interpretation. A critical analysis could 
consider how the national courts engage with the CJEU via the preliminary rulings to shed 
light on the triangular relationship244 as well as how the cultural context and factors identified 
in the previous step resonate in the courts’ reasoning, application and interpretation of 
national law implementing EU harmonized law. Thus, the analysis would consider how the 
national courts attempt to reconcile the potentially conflicting national and European 
influence on the judicial reception of EU harmonized law by reference to the courts’ dialogue 
as well as national context.  
However, the case law does not need to be limited to disputes that involve preliminary 
references. The CJEU’s consideration of pregnancy discrimination under the scope of sex 
discrimination can be explored within connected national narratives that are played out in 
court even if there was no direct preliminary reference from that Member State. Dutch courts 
and quasi-judicial bodies adopted the CJEU logic that pregnancy discrimination constitutes 
sex discrimination because only women can become pregnant. They then extended the same 
logic to areas that had not been conclusively decided by the CJEU yet, such as the treatment 
of women who suffer pregnancy-related illnesses after childbirth. They again modified their 
approach after the CJEU decision in McKenna, where the CJEU deviated from such a 
logic.245 The consideration of how these disputes play out over time and potentially invite the 
national courts to adopt different approaches at different times can reveal the power struggles 
of the competing influences on the national level as well as the courts’ difficulties with the 
CJEU’s interpretation—particularly in cases where it does not follow their expectations of 
logical or consistent development.  
Other dominant case-sagas concerning the application of the national law implementing EU 
directives can also be considered, even if there is no CJEU judgment on the matter, as it can 
still reveal something of the status of these directives and how national factors discussed in 
the previous step resonate in the courts’ case law. One example of this is the German case 
law on the so-called AGG-Hopper. This term has been used within German academia and the 
wider public to describe people who abuse the rights under the German General Equal 
Treatment Act (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, AGG)for financial purposes. A 
typical example would be a man who replies to a job advertisement for a female secretary 
even though he is neither qualified for the work nor has any intention of taking the position. 
As the narrative goes, these people only apply for the work so they can claim compensation 
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once they are rejected, and national courts have repeatedly debunked such claims.246 Within 
these cases, national influences on the judicial reception of the harmonized law can become 
particularly obvious, since there is little CJEU interference. Thus, the reasoning and 
justification for the specific interpretation within the cases should reflect some of the national 
concerns regarding the law and may further reveal how the previously discussed national 
factors, such as cultural background, political or ethical stances, are adopted within the legal 
reasoning. The previous discussion of the national context in the second step makes it more 
likely that these factors are considered and identified once the case law is analyzed.  
Overall, the choice of the national case law that should be considered depends on its 
relevance regarding the harmonized law that is compared. This obviously includes cases that 
directly apply the harmonized law. But it can go beyond that and consider cases addressing 
issues that could have been assessed under the scope of the law but instead were dealt with 
under the scope of related legal instruments. For example, it has been demonstrated that 
German courts are much more comfortable dealing with cases on religious freedom, while 
English courts address similar cases under the scope of religious discrimination.247 This, inter 
alia, can demonstrate the dominance of the Constitution within the broader discourse around 
equality and discrimination. It suggests that national courts privilege constitutional values 
over harmonized law, even if the latter is not contrary to the constitutional principles. Such 
insights can only be gained once the comparatist broadens the scope of consideration and 
includes cases that do not directly refer to the law in question. The choice of cases, thus 
starting with the consideration of the case law on the harmonized law, can thus still benefit 
from the learning of functionalism, as it considers cases that may fulfill a similar function but 
by different means. However, it should not be limited to that. After all, it is highly uncertain 
what functions the harmonized law itself fulfills. Rather, the choice of cases may be better 
determined by the theoretical and normative framework defined in the first step. Supporters 
of critical functionalism have suggested that the search for the functionalist equivalent should 
go beyond the legal and avoid legocentric analyses by considering a multitude of legal and 
non-legal mechanisms that may all serve a specific aim.248 Thus, functional equivalents to 
ensure sex equality could include non-discrimination law and rights to equal treatment, but it 
could also include related legal protections, such as the right to maternity leave, child care 
facilities and welfare law, as well as social and cultural programs that foster a more equal 
society. However, the methodological approach developed in this article does not aim to 
identify functional equivalents. Rather, it tries to engage the mind-set of critical comparison 
to identify how the harmonized law is situated within the national context and how it 
functions under national as well as European influences upon its interpretation and 
application. The choice of case law to be compared should be determined by what it tells us 
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about the position of harmonized law within the national context. This, of course, does not 
mean that there are other legal or non-legal mechanisms that may also support the aims 
stipulated or implied in the directives. 
In this third stage, the aim is to identify and address the legal formants which affected the 
national application of the law as well as critically reveal how non-legal concepts, social 
reality, power dimensions, and general cultural self-understanding shape the law and how 
contradictory approaches make alternative conclusions possible. Both questions can only be 
addressed and answered by a deep understanding of the socio-cultural and socio-political 
context of the legal systems (the second step) and their subsequent identification and 
modification within the case-law analysis. While most EU Member States’ legal orders exist 
within similar paradigms and parameters or may even belong to the same ‘folk culture’,249 the 
cultural differences that affect the legal consciousness must not be underestimated, despite 
possible convergence within some areas of Member States’ law.250 This article proposes to 
identify some of these national factors by engaging with national cultural and political 
discourses linked to the harmonized law and a deep engagement with national case law and 
courts’ reasoning to identify whether these factors resonate within the courts’ case law. It is 
thus a ‘bottom-up’ approach or inductive method that first engages with the national cultural 
context and then considers how this context influences the legal reasoning and legal 
application. The separate consideration of both should make it possible to identify implied 
cultural and political considerations that would not be obvious by the sole consideration of 
the national case law and implemented legislation. The analysis should thus go beyond the 
question of whether and how national courts actually recognize the CJEU preliminary 
rulings251 by considering what other visible and invisible influences (including non-legal 
concepts within society) actually determine the judgments, behaviors and attitudes of the 
judges (toward the legal concepts and the CJEU interpretation) revealed within the case law. 
Conclusion 
There is an old and often repeated saying that one cannot compare apples and oranges,252 
which could be applied to the incommensurability of legal systems253 and the need to 
compare like traditions with like. However, for a comparison to be fruitful, there also needs 
to be some difference between national legal systems.254 Structuralism is certainly determined 
to reveal national legal formants by comparing different legal systems, but whether a 
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comparison is meaningful depends on the research question. Just as it is possible to compare 
apples and oranges regarding, for example, their vitamin levels, color or taste, it is possible to 
compare very different as well as very similar legal systems255 as long as there is a clear 
articulation of the aim of the comparison and what personal and extrinsic factors256 affect it. 
Ultimately, there is no need to develop one universally applicable method to compare law. 
Instead, it is far more important to make strategic decisions regarding the comparison itself257 
and to consider the methodological implications of these decisions and the limitations of the 
comparatist’s own ability to understand the foreign and appreciate the law within each 
broader cultural context. 
The main submission of this article is that it is necessary to focus on domestic contextual 
influences in the comparison of harmonized law to understand why this law is applied 
differently by the courts of the Member States even though hybrid legislation has the same 
European origin and the national courts are required to respect the CJEU’s competence in 
interpreting Union law. As demonstrated below, traditional comparative law methods are 
incapable of uncovering these differences because of their a priori assumptions regarding 
social problems. This creates an ‘epistemic foundation’ for the law, and it limits the ability to 
recognize the national legal and non-legal contexts that influence the judicial reception of EU 
harmonized law. The method proposed here is helpful not only in revealing the differences 
concerning the application of harmonized law but also in identifying some of the reasons for 
those differences. It is thus mainly explanatory. However, the culturally-informed mind-set 
may also highlight the possibility of a critical evaluation of harmonization processes that 
allows for diversity within the Member States and recognition of alternative mechanisms that 
can achieve similar aims but compete or contradict the directives’ approach. Current 
discussion on legal standards within the Member States certainly falls short of such deep and 
diversity-sensitive comparison by mainly focusing on textual analysis alone.258 Essentially, 
the proposed approach encourages a deep engagement with the national legal systems. 
Similarities between national orders as a result of the harmonization process and the national 
implementation of the directives can reveal deep, underlying differences between national 
legal systems that differently affect harmonized law once it reaches the national arena. Once 
national systems superficially converge because of the harmonization process, comparative 
studies can focus on these deeper differences underpinning the national legal systems, as 
there is less distraction because of similar or different legislative approaches. 
The multi-layered culturally informed method proposes a cross-country comparison between 
the Member States by focusing on national influences on the courts’ application and their 
engagement in the triangular relationship. It does so by proposing the consideration of 
overlapping but diverse cultural, political and legal narratives surrounding the harmonized 
law. Fundamentally, the method attempts to address three interconnected arguments. Firstly, 
that to evaluate the successes and limits of European legal transplants, they need to be 
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considered at the (final) point of their interpretation and application within the national 
context. The comparison of national law implementing EU law (i.e., directives) is of special 
interest here because these laws create a bridge between the European and the national 
context.259 Legislation harmonizing the Member States’ legal systems and their 
implementation process transforms EU law into national law and is, therefore, governed by 
national paradigms, doctrine and the wider national (legal) culture. At the same time, 
directives remain part of the European legal framework, and the CJEU is able to provide 
binding interpretations of the directives.260 Moreover, directives addressing social issues such 
as equality, labor law standards or consumer protection often address traditionally separate 
areas of private and public law. They embody principles recognized by international and 
national constitutional law as well as primary EU law. The multi-layered influences on the 
national application are thus particularly obvious. These influences can, however, only 
transpire at the stage of application. Secondly, a meaningful comparison of the application of 
harmonized law requires the consideration of the legal and non-legal contexts that can 
influence the success or failure of the European transplant on a national level. Laws 
implementing directives, being national and European law (‘legal hybrids’),261 are specially 
situated within the national legal system and face multi-layered national influences and 
beyond. Meaningful comparison of harmonized law needs to capture these contextual 
influences on legal application. This goes beyond the considerations of different legal 
traditions (such as monism and dualism, or common and civil law), but it requires the 
consideration of social, cultural, historic, economic and political factors. A comparative law 
method should thus challenge us to go beyond the legal to allow political and cultural 
narratives to emerge. Thirdly, the comparison needs to be aware of feedback effects. Thus, 
while concepts are developed in one context, they can influence other contexts and then 
feedback to the original source of the concepts while simultaneously changing throughout the 
process. A comparative method to compare harmonized law needs to be able to encapsulate 
these developments by allowing space for multi-layered narratives and dialogue between the 
national courts and the CJEU as well as other social partners and stakeholders. 
The proposed three-step approach aims at providing room for multi-layered narratives 
concerning the application of harmonized law, including international, European, and 
national influences as well as cultural and political dimensions. In the first step, normative 
and theoretical considerations regarding the chosen area of comparison provide space for 
considering the possible aims of the harmonized law, as well as the possibility of the 
accomplishment of these aims within the existing legal frameworks, including the CJEU’s. 
The first step thus primarily focuses on the European vertex of the triangular relationship, but 
it also provides a general theoretical framework. The second step focuses on the national 
vertices and looks at what happens to the European law once it reaches the national arena. 
This includes the consideration of the national legal context and other cultural and historical 
factors relevant to the application of harmonized law. The third step uses case law analysis to 
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explore the dialogue between the CJEU and the national courts and how this differs between 
the different national systems. The comparison explores which CJEU judgments have been 
particularly influential at the national level and which national factors have shaped the 
national courts’ interpretation and have potentially overridden European influences.  
The proposed method does not aim at reaching absolute truth. Nonetheless, it seeks to make a 
significant contribution based on workable objectivity towards a better understanding of EU 
law and its reception and enforcement at the national level and, thus, to influence the 
harmonization process. Cultures and traditions are hybrids involving various, often 
contradictory, ‘objective truths’. These different and potentially conflicting views are all 
elements within one diverse legal culture or tradition.262 Even when all relevant information 
is provided for the comparison, a selection needs to be made according to various limitations. 
Limitations may be temporal (limited time available) or psychological because no human 
mind is able to remember and consider all relevant factors at once.263 ‘There is just too much 
diversity to come to any single answer.’264 This selection is consequently suboptimal and 
depends on our way of viewing the world.265 Consequently, it can always be criticized, and 
there is no single best solution to assess reality.266 It has thus been argued that comparative 
studies can ‘never be conclusive, but only suggestive.’267  
However, this does not mean that methodological concerns do not need to be recognized. 
Contemporary researchers and comparative lawyers have to work within the framework of 
contemporary discourse and recognize the shortcomings of the used approaches.268 The 
comparative process requires the scholar to be self-critical and recognize his or her own 
cultural context as well as the other.269 It requires an understanding of the law as an 
institution with multiple functions and that is affected by a ‘deeper culture’ underpinning the 
legal concepts and their applications.270 Comparison of the judicial reception of harmonized 
law can be achieved by engaging in overlapping cultural and political narratives that do not 
focus on the legal alone and in the subsequent investigation of how these narratives resonate 
within the legal reasoning. The result of such critical progression is what one might call 
workable objectivity. It is not absolute. That would only be possible in a theoretical model 
that disregards parts of reality.271 Within a theoretical a priori determined framework, a 
model has an inherent logic that makes it possible to receive absolute answers within it. 
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However, once one steps outside this model and into reality, it is impossible to consider all 
influential factors and reach an ‘absolute truth’. Any solution will thus be open to criticism 
and counter-evidence. This is especially true within social science, in which it is impossible 
to separate the observer and the object of research, since the object is too complex.272 In that 
sense, methodological considerations are not necessary to develop one universal method but 
to consider the implications of the methodological choices the researcher unavoidably has to 
make and to ensure the transparency of the comparative analysis. 
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